Belief revision of knowledge bases represented by a set of sentences in a given logic has been extensively studied but for specific logics, mainly propositional, but also recently Horn and description logics. Here, we propose to generalize this operation from a model-theoretic point of view, by defining revision in a categorical abstract model theory known under the name of theory of institutions. In this framework, we generalize to any institution the characterization of the well known AGM postulates given by Katsuno and Mendelzon for propositional logic in terms of minimal change with respect to an ordering among interpretations. Moreover, we study how to define revision, satisfying the AGM postulates, from relaxation notions that have been first introduced in description logics to define dissimilarity measures between concepts, and the consequence of which is to relax the set of models of the old belief until it becomes consistent with the new pieces of knowledge. The proposed general framework can be instantiated in different logics such as propositional, description and Horn logics.
Introduction
Belief change is a field of knowledge representation that has received much attention in recent years. It is defined by three change operations, expansion, contraction and revision, that make evolve an agent belief with a new acquired knowledge. Belief expansion consists on adding new knowledge without checking consistency, whilst both contraction and revision consist on removing and adding, respectively, but consistently new knowledge. When knowledge bases are logical theories, i.e. a set of sentences in a given logic, these changes are governed by a set of postulates that have been set for the first time by Alchourròn, Gardenfors and Makinson [1] , and since known as the AGM theory. Although defined in the abstract framework of logics given by Tarski [21] , postulates of the AGM theory make strong assumptions on considered logics. Indeed, these latter (so-called Tarskian logics) have to be closed under the standard propositional connectors in {∧, ∨, ¬, ⇒}, to be compact (i.e. property entailment depends on a finite set of axioms), and to satisfy the deduction theorem (i.e. entailment and implication are equivalent).
While compactness is a standard property of logics, to be closed under the standard propositional connectors is more questionable. Indeed, many non-classical logics such as description logics, equational logic or Horn clause logic widely used for various modern applications in computing science, do not satisfy such a constraint. Many works have then been proposed to study belief change in such non-classical logics. In this direction, we can cite Ribeiro & al. 's work in [18] that studies contraction at the abstract level of Tarskian logics. On the contrary, the adaptation of AGM postulates for revision for non-classical logics has been studied but for specific logics, mainly around description logics [13, 15, 16, 22] and Horn logics [6, 23] . The reason is revision can be abstractly defined in terms of expansion and retraction following the Levi identity but this requires the use of negation which rules out non-classical logics [17] .
Moreover, the AGM theory gives no minimality criteria on removed or changed formulae, and then on the set of models of knowledge bases. Recently, both for contraction and revision, propositions of generalisation of AGM theory have been proposed in the framework of Tarskian Logics considering minimality criteria on removed formulae [18, 17] . The aim was to study contraction and revision for a larger family of logics containing non-classical ones such as description logics and Horn logics. On the contrary, up to our knowledge, generalisation of AGM theory with minimality criteria on the set of models of knowledge bases have never been proposed. The reason is semantics is not explicit in the abstract framework of logics defined by Tarski. We then propose here to generalise AGM revision but in a categorical abstract model theory, the theory of institutions [11] , which formalises the intuitive notion of logical system, including syntax, semantics and the satisfaction relation. Then, we propose to generalise to any institution the approach developed in [12] for the propositional logic and in [14] for the description logics. In this abstract framework, we will also show how to define revision operators from relaxation notion that have been introduced in description logics to define dissimilarity measures between concepts [9, 10] and the consequence of which is to relax the set of models of the old belief until it becomes consistent with the new pieces of knowledge.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews some concepts, notations and terminology about institutions which are used by this work. In Section 3, we adapt AGM theory in the framework of institutions, and then give an abstract model-theoretic rewriting of AGM postulates. We then show in Section 3.2 that any revision operators satisfying such postulates accomplishes an update with minimal change to the set of models of knowledge bases. In Section 3.3, we introduce a general framework of relaxation-based revision operators and show that our revision operators lead to faithful assignment and then satisfy AGM postulates. In Section 4, we illustrate our abstract approach by providing revision operators in different logics, mainly non-classical logics such as Horn logics and description logics. Finally, Section 5 is dedicated to related works.
Institutions
The theory of institutions [11] is a categorical abstract model theory which emerges in computing science studies of software specification and semantics, in the context of the population explosion of logics there, with the ambition of doing as much as possible at the level of abstraction independent of commitment to any particular logic. Now institutions have become a common tool in the area of formal specification, in fact its most fundamental mathematical structure. 
Basic definitions and examples
This goes a step beyond Tarski's classic "semantic definition of truth" [20] and also generalises Barwise's "Translation Axiom" [2] . Moreover, it is fundamental that sentences translate in the same direction as the change of notation, whereas models translate in the opposite direction (think of signature enrichment and model reduction). This is the reason for the functor M od in Definition 2.1 below to be contravariant. For the sake of generalisation, signatures are simply defined as objects of a category and sentences built over a signature are simply required to form a set. All other contingencies such as inductive definition of sentences are not considered. Similarly, models are simply seen as objects of a category, i.e. no particular structure is imposed on them.
Example 2.2
The following examples of institutions are of particular importance for computer science. Many other examples can be found in the literature (e.g. [11, 19] Given a signature Σ = (S, F, P ), the Σ-atoms are of two possible forms: t1 = t2 where t1, t2 ∈ TF (X)s 3 (s ∈ S), and p(t1, . . . , tn) where p : s1 × . . . × sn ∈ P and ti ∈ TF (X)s i (1 ≤ i ≤ n, si ∈ S). The set of Σ-sentences is the least set of formulae built over the set of Σ-atoms by finitely applying Boolean connectives in {¬, ∨} and the quantifier ∀. Given a signature Σ = (S, F, P ), a Σ-model M is a family M = (Ms)s∈S of sets (one for every s ∈ S), each one equipped with a function f M : Ms 1 × . . . × Ms n → Ms for every f : s1 × . . . × sn → s ∈ F and with a n-ary relation
, and for every function name f ∈ F and predicate name 
Rewriting Logic (RWL)
Given an algebraic signature Σ = (S, F ), Σ-sentences are formulae of the form ϕ :
. Models of rewriting logic are preorder models, i.e. given a signature Σ = (S, F ), M od(Σ) is the category of Σ-algebras A such that for every s ∈ S, As is equipped with a preorder ≥. Hence, A |= ϕ if and only if for every variable interpretation ν : 4 The category of signatures is the category of FOL signatures. Given a FOL signature Σ = (S, F, P ), Σ-axioms are of the form p(t1, . . . , tn) and the set of Σ-formulae is the least set of formulae built over the set of Σ-axioms by finitely applying Boolean connectives in {¬, ∨} and the quantifier ∀ and the modality . Given a signature Σ = (S, F, P ), a Σ-model (W, R), called Kripke frame, consists of a family W = (W i )i∈I of Σ-models in FOL (the possible worlds) such that
Modal First Order Logic with global satisfaction (MFOL)
for every i, j ∈ I and s ∈ S, and an"accessibility" relation
Σ is inductively defined on the structure of ϕ as follows:
• atoms, Boolean connectives and quantifier are handled as in FOL,
Modal propositional logic (MPL) is the sub-institution of MFOL whose signatures are restricted to empty sets of sorts and function names and only 0-ary predicate names.
3 T F (X)s is the term algebra of sort s built over F with sorted variables in a given set X. 4 aka. quantified modal logic K. 5 In the literature, Kripke frames satisfying such a property are said with constant domains.
Modal First Order Logic with local satisfaction (LMFOL) Signatures and sentences are
MFOL signatures and MFOL sentences. Given a signature Σ = (S,
LMFOL with infinite disjunction and conjunction (LIMFOL) This institution extends LM-
FOL to sentences of the form Φ and Φ where Φ is a set (possibly infinite) of Σ-sentences. Given a pointed Kripke frame (W, R, W j ), 
and for every individual with a value
, and for every
Given a Σ-model O and a context C over the signature Σ, the evaluation of C in O is inductively defined on the structure of C as follows:
The satisfaction relation |=Σ is then defined:
Knowledge base and theories in institutions
Let us now consider a fixed but arbitrary institution I = (Sig, Sen, M od, |=) such that Sign is cocomplete (i.e. it has both pushout and coproduct) 7 . This latter property will allow us to consider every time in the following sets of sentences over a same signature. Notation 2.3 Let Σ ∈ |Sig| be a signature and T be a set of Σ-sentences.
• M od(T ) is the full sub-category of M od(Σ) whose objects are models of T ,
These two functions denoted respectively M od( ) and * form what is know as a Galois connection in that they satisfy the following properties:
Definition 2.4 (Knowledge base and theory) A knowledge base T is a set of Σ-sentences (i.e. T ⊆ Sen(Σ)) 9 . A knowledge base T is said to be a theory if, and only if T = Cn(T ). A theory T is finitely representable if there exists a finite set
T ′ ⊆ Sen(Σ) such that T = Cn(T ′ ).
Proposition 2.5 For every institution I, we have:
Proof Inclusion and iteration are obvious properties of the mapping Cn by definition 10 . Suppose T ⊆ T ′ . By the first property of the Galois connection above between M od( ) and Cn( ), we have that M od(T ′ ) ⊆ M od(T ). Let ϕ ∈ Cn(T ). Therefore, we have for every M ∈ M od(T ′ ), that M |=Σ ϕ, and then ϕ ∈ Cn(T ′ ).
Hence, institutions are Tarskian according to the definition of logics given by Tarski under which a logic is a pair (L, Cn) where L is a set of expressions (formulae) and Cn : P(L) → P(L) is a mapping that satisfies the inclusion, iteration and monotonicity properties [21] . Indeed, from any institution I we can define the following Tarskian logic (L, Cn) where
• Given a set T ⊆ L, as I is cocomplete, there exists a signature Σ such that T ⊆ Sen(Σ) 11 . Then, Cn(T ) = {ϕ ∈ Sen(Σ) | ∀M ∈ M od(T ), M |=Σ ϕ}.
Classically, consistency of a theory T is defined as M od(T ) = ∅. The problem of such definition of consistency is its significance depends on the actual institution I. Hence, such consistency is significant for FOL, while in EQL and FHCL it is a trivial property since each set of sentences is consistent because M od(T ) always contains the trivial model. Here, to be more appropriate with our purpose to define revision for the largest family of logics, we propose a more general definition of consistency the meaning of which is there is at least a sentence which is not a semantic consequence. 
Definition 2.6 (Consistency)
T ⊆ Sen(Σ) is consistent if Cn(T ) = Sen(Σ).
Proposition 2.7 For every T ⊆ Sen(Σ), T is consistent if, and only if
Classically, Postulates (G4) and (G4-bis) are grouped into a same postulate
11 By definition, for every ϕ ∈ T , there exists a signature Σϕ such that ϕ ∈ Sen(Σϕ). Then, Σ is the coproduct of the diagram built over the signatures in {Σϕ | ϕ ∈ T }.
Obviously, (G4) and (G4-bis) imply (G'4). The interest of breaking Postulate (G'4) into Postulates (G4) and (G4-bis) is that in the proof of Theorem 3.2, we will mainly refer to Postulate (G4) to show the first implication.
Intuitively, any revision operator • satisfying the five postulates above, effects minimal change, that is the models of T • T ′ are the models of T that are closest to models of M od(T ′ ) according to some metric distance for measuring the "distance" between models. This is what will be shown in the next section by showing a correspondence between AGM Postulates and orders over models.
Orders and AGM postulates
Let Σ be a signature. Let M ⊆ M od(Σ). A pre-order over M is a reflexive and transitive binary relation over M. We define ≺ as M ≺ M ′ if, and only if
is well-founded if any infinite descending sequence of models (Mi) i∈N is stationary, i.e. there exists j ∈ N such that for every k ≥ j,
Definition 3.1 (Faithful assignment) Let T ⊆ Sen(Σ) be a knowledge base. Let T ⊆ M od(Σ)× M od(Σ) be a total pre-order. T is a faithful assignment (FA) if the following three conditions
are satisfied:
for every M ∈ M od(T ) and every
M ′ ∈ M od(Σ) \ M od(T ), M ≺T M ′ .
for every T
The property for T to be well-founded is not required in the paper [12] that introduces for the first time this notion of faithful assignment. The reason is revision is studied in the framework of propositional logic whose the set of interpretations for finite signatures is also finite, and then obviously, faithful pre-orders between interpretations are well-founded. More astonishment, this property is also not imposed in the paper [14] that studies revision in description logics. The consequence is Theorem 1 in [14] that makes a correspondence between AGM postulates and minimal models according to FA pre-orders, does not hold because of the condition (G3) in [14] ((G1) here). This leads to the following representation theorem in our framework.
Theorem 3.2 Let
• be a revision operator. Then,
if • satisfies Postulates (G1)-(G5), then there exists a FA for any knowledge base
T such that M od(T • T ′ ) = M in(M od(T ′ ) \ {M ∈ M od(Σ) | M * = Sen(Σ)}, T ).
If there exists a FA for any knowledge base T which is further well-founded such that
M od(T • T ′ ) = M in(M od(T ′ ) \ {M ∈ M od(Σ) | M * = Sen(Σ)}, T )
, then • satisfies Postulates (G1)-(G5).
Proof The proof draws heavily from that given in the paper [12] .
Let us suppose that • satisfies (G1)-(G5). For every knowledge base T , let us define the binary relation
Let us first show that T is a total pre-order.
Three cases have to be considered:
Case 2. M ∈M od(T ) and M
. By (G2), we also have that M ∈ M od(M ′ * ), and then M ∈ M od(T ) which contradicts our assumptions. Therefore, this case is impossible. Case 3. M ∈M od(T ) and M ′ ∈M od(T ). By definition of T , we have: 
•
Here, two cases have to be considered:
By (G2) and (G5), we can write
In the same way, we
what is a contradiction.
2. Let us suppose that there exists a FA which is further well-founded for any knowledge
(G1) Let T ′ be a consistent knowledge base. Therefore, we have M od(T ′ ) \ {M ∈ M od(Σ) | M * = Sen(Σ)} = ∅, and then T being well-founded, we also have
As T is a FA, by the first condition of FA, we also have that
(G4-bis) Let us suppose that Cn(T ′ ) ⊆ Cn(T ′′ ). We then have that M od(T ′′ ) ⊆ M od(T ′ ). Therefore, by the third property of FA, we have T ′′ ⊆ T ′ , and then
, and then we also have that
, and then M ≺T M ′ what is a contradiction.
Relaxation and AGM postulates
Relaxation have been introduced in [9, 10] in the framework of description logics with the aim of definition dissimilarity between concepts. Here, we propose to generalise this notion in the framework of institutions.
Definition 3.3 (Relaxation)
Given a signature Σ ∈ Sign. A Σ-relaxation is a mapping ρ : Sen(Σ) → Sen(Σ) satisfying:
The interest of relaxations is they give rise to revision operators.
Definition 3.4 (Revision based in relaxation)
Let ρ be a Σ-relaxation. We define the revision operator • : P(Sen(Σ)) × P(Sen(Σ)) → P(Sen(Σ)) as follows:
and such that:
• T1 • T2 is consistent
minimality on the number of applying the relaxation)
• Minimality criteria on the partition T
Partitioning T1 into T By definition, for every n ∈ N, M ∈ M od(ρ n (T )). Moreover, by both conditions of relaxations, there exists k ∈ N such that M ′ ∈ M od(ρ k (T )) and for every k
To simplify the proof, we suppose that
e. if T = T1 T2, then T2 = ∅), the more general case where T2 = ∅ being able to be easily obtained from this more simple case.
where Bν contains all the models that satisfy some relationship with ν. The relationship standardly used is a discrete distance δ between models, and the most commonly used is the Hamming distance dH where dH(ν, ν ′ ) for two propositional models over a same signature Σ is the number of propositional symbols that are instantiated differently in ν and ν ′ . From any distance δ between models, a distance from models to a formula is derived as follows: d(ν, ϕ) = min ν ′ |=ϕ δ(ν, ν ′ ). In this case, we can rewrite the dilation of formula as follows:
This consists on using the distance ball radius 1 as structuring elements. To ensure the exhaustivity condition to our relaxation, we need to add a condition on distances, the betweenness property [9] .
Definition 4.1 (Betweenness property) Let δ be a discrete distance over a set S. δ has the betweenness property if for all x, y ∈ S and all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , δ(x, y)}, there exists z ∈ S such that δ(x, z) = k and δ(z, y) = δ(x, y) − k.
The Hamming distance trivially satisfies the betweenness property. The interest for our purpose of this property is it allows from any model to reach any other ones, and then ensuring the exhaustivity property of relaxation 12 .
Proposition 4.2 DB is a relaxation when it is applied to formulae ϕ ∈ Sen(Σ) such that Σ is a finite set, and it is based on models distance that satisfies the betweenness property.
Proof It is extensive. Indeed, for every ϕ and for every model ν ∈ M od(ϕ), we have that d(ν, ϕ) = 0, and then ϕ |= DB(ϕ). Exhaustivity results on the fact that considered signatures are finite set and the betweenness property.
Revision in HCL
Many works have focused on belief revision involving propositional Horn formulas (cf. [7] to have an overview on these works). Here, we propose to extend relaxations that we have defined in the framework of PL to deal with the Horn fragment of propositional theories. First, let us introduce some notions that we will later use.
Definition 4.3 (Model intersection)
Given a propositional signature Σ and two Σ-models ν, ν ′ :
is then the closure of S under intersection of positive atoms. It is well-known that for any set S closed under intersection of positive atoms, there exists a Horn sentence ϕ that defines S (i.e. M od(ϕ) = S). Given a models distance δ, we then define the relaxation mapping ρ as follows: For every Horn formula ϕ, ρ(ϕ) is any Horn formula ϕ ′ such that M od(ϕ ′ ) = cl∩(M od(DB(ϕ)) (by the previous property, we know that such a formula ϕ ′ exists).
Proposition 4.4 With the same conditions than in Proposition 4.2, the mapping ρ is a relaxation.
12 Hence, dilation of formulae would be able to be also defined by using distance ball radius n as structuring elements [4] .
Revision in FOL
A trivial way to define a relaxation in FOL is to map any formula to a tautology. A less trivial and more interesting relaxation is to change universal quantifiers to existential ones. Indeed, given a formula ϕ of the form ∀x.ψ. If ϕ is not consistent with a given theory T , ∃x.ψ may be consistent with T (If it cannot be consistent for all values, it can be for some of them). In the following we suppose that given a signature Σ, every formula ϕ ∈ Sen(Σ) is a disjunction of formulae in prenex form (i.e. ϕ is of the form j Q
.ψj where each Q j i ∈ {∀, ∃}). Let us define the relaxation ρ as follows: we give a tautology τ
• Let ϕ = Q1x1 . . . Qnxn.ψ be a formula such that the set
Proposition 4.5 ρ is a relaxation.
Proof It is obviously extensive, and exhaustivity results on the fact that in a finite number of steps, we always reach the tautology τ .
Revision in DL
As already explained in Section 3.3, relaxation has been introduced in [9, 10] . It has been first defined over concepts, and then extended to formulae. In [9, 10] , concept relaxation is defined as follows: Definition 4.6 (Concept relaxation) Given a signature Σ = (NC , NR, I), we note C(Σ) the set of concepts over Σ. A concept relaxation ρ : C(Σ) → C(Σ) is mapping that satisfies:
A trivial concept relaxation is the operation ρ ⊤ that maps every concept C to ⊤. Other non-trivial concrete concept relaxations such as the one that changes universal quantifiers to existential ones as in FOL 13 , can be found in [9, 10] . From any relaxation concept ρ, we can define the relaxation mapping on formulae that we also note ρ as follows: we suppose that any signature Σ = (NC , NR, I) always contains in NR a relation name r ⊤ the meaning of which is in any model O, r Proof This directly results from both properties of Definition 4.6.
Related work
Recently a first proposition of generalisation of AGM revision has been proposed in the framework of Tarskian Logics considering minimality criteria on removed formulae [17] following previous works of same authors for contraction [18] . Representation results that make a correspondence between a large family of logics containing non-classical logics such as DL and HCL and AGM postulates for revision with such minimality criteria have then been obtained. Here, the proposed generalisation also gives similar representation theorems (cf. Theorem 3.2) but for a different minimality criteria. Indeed, we showed in Section 3.2 that revision operators satisfying Postulates (G1)-(G5) are precisely the ones that accomplish an update with minimal change to the set of models of knowledge bases generalising to any institution the approach developed in [12] for the logic PL and [14] for DL. However, our revision operator based on relaxation also has a minimality criteria on removed formulae. Indeed, in [17] in addition to the standard AGM postulates for revision, the authors to express their minimality criteria on removed formulae introduced the postulate (Relevance) that can be written in our framework as follows:
(Relevance) if ϕ ∈ T \ (T • T ′ ), then there exists X, T ∩ (T • T ′ ) ⊆ X ⊆ T , such that Cn(X ∪ T ′ ) = Sen(Σ) and Cn(X ∪ {ϕ} ∪ T ′ ) = Sen(Σ)
And, we have the following result.
Proposition 5.1 The revision operator of Definition 3.4 satisfies (Relevance).
Proof Let ϕ ∈ T1 \ (T1 • T2). By definition, this means that ϕ ∈ T ′ 1 . Therefore, it is sufficient to set X = T ′′ 1 . By the last condition of Defintion 3.4, the minimality criteria on removed formulae of (Relevance) is obviously satisfied.
Conclusion
We provided a generalization of belief revision from a model-theoretic point of view, by defining this operator in a categorical abstract model theory known under the name of theory of institutions. In this framework, we then generalized to any institution the characterization of the AGM postulates given by Katsuno and Mendelzon for propositional logic in terms of minimal change with respect to an ordering among interpretations. Finally, we studied how to define revision, satisfying the AGM postulates, from relaxation notions, and illustrated our approach to both classical and non-classical logics. Future works will concern the study of our generalization to other non-classical logics such as first-order Horn logics or equational logics.
